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The paper discusses recent proposals by Carroll and Chen, as well as Bar-
bour, Koslowski, and Mercati to explain the (thermodynamic) arrow of time
without a Past Hypothesis, i.e. the assumption of a special (low-entropy)
initial state of the universe. After discussing the role of the Past Hypothesis
and the controversy about its status, we explain why Carroll’s model – which
establishes an arrow of time as typical – can ground sensible predictions and
retrodictions without assuming something akin to a Past Hypothesis. We
then propose a definition of a Boltzmann entropy for a classical N -particle
system with gravity, suggesting that a Newtonian gravitating universe might
provide a relevant example of Carroll’s entropy model. This invites compari-
son with the work of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati that identifies typical
arrows of time in a relational formulation of classical gravity on shape space.
We clarify the difference between this gravitational arrow in terms of shape
complexity and the entropic arrow in absolute spacetime, and work out the
key advantages of the relationalist theory. We end by pointing out why the
entropy concept relies on absolute scales and is thus not relational.
1 The easy and the hard problem of irreversibility
What is the difference between past and future? Why do so many physical processes
occur in only one time direction, despite the fact that they are governed or described,
on the fundamental level, by time-symmetric microscopic laws? These questions are
intimately linked to the notion of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics. From
the point of view of fundamental physics, it is the second law of thermodynamics that
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accounts for such phenomena as that gases expand rather than contract, that glasses
break but don’t spontaneously reassemble, that heat flows from hotter to colder bodies,
that a car slows down and doesn’t accelerate once you stop hitting the gas. All these are
examples of irreversible processes, associated with an increase of entropy in the relevant
physical systems.
Goldstein (2001) – possibly inspired by Chalmers’ discussion of the mind-body prob-
lem (Chalmers, 1995) – distinguishes between the easy part and the hard part of the
problem of irreversibility. The easy part of the problem is: Why do isolated systems in a
state of low entropy typically evolve into states of higher entropy (but not the other way
round)? The answer to this question was provided by Ludwig Boltzmann who reduced
the second law of thermodynamics to the statistical mechanics of point particles. He
thereby developed insights and concepts whose relevance goes beyond the confines of
any particular microscopic theory.
The first crucial concept of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics is the distinction be-
tween micro- and macrostates. Whereas the microstate X(t) of a system is given by
the complete specification of its microscopic degrees of freedom, its macrostate M(t)
is specified by (approximate) values of “observables” that characterize the system on
macroscopic scales (typical examples are volume, pressure, temperature, magnetization,
and so on). The macroscopic state of a system is completely determined by its micro-
scopic configuration, that is M(t) = M(X(t)), but one and the same macrostate can
be realized by a large (in general infinite) number of different microstates, all of which
“look macroscopically the same”. Partitioning the microscopic state space into sets cor-
responding to macroscopically distinct configurations is therefore called coarse-graining.
Turning to the phase space picture of Hamiltonian mechanics for an N -particle sys-
tem, a microstate corresponds to one point X = (q, p) in phase space Ω ∼= R3N × R3N ,
q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) being the position- and p = (p1, . . . ,pN ) the momentum-coordinates
of the particles, whereas a macrostate M corresponds to an entire region ΓM ⊆ Ω of
phase space (“macroregion”), namely the set of all microstates coarse-graining to M .
Boltzmann then realized that for macroscopic systems – that is, systems with a very
large numbers of microscopic degrees of freedom – different macrostates will in general
correspond to macroregions of vastly different size, as measured by the pertinent sta-
tionary phase space measure (the Lebesgue- or Liouville-measure in case of a classical
Hamiltonian system), with the equilibrium state corresponding to the macroregion of by
far largest measure, exhausting almost the entire phase space volume. The Boltzmann
entropy of a system is now defined as the logarithm of the phase space volume covered
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by its current macroregion (times a dimensional constant called Boltzmann constant):
S(X(t)) = kB log |ΓM(X(t))|. (1)
Since the entropy is an extensive macrovariable (proportional to N , the number of mi-
croscopic constituents), we see that the ratio of phase space volume corresponding to
macroregions of significantly different entropy values is of order exp(N), where N ∼ 1024
even for “small” macroscopic systems (the relevant order of magnitude is given by Avo-
gadro’s constant). We thus understand why, under the chaotic microdynamics of a
many-particle system, a microstate starting in a small (low-entropy) region of phase
space will typically evolve into larger and larger macroregions, corresponding to higher
and higher entropy, until it reaches the equilibrium state where it will spend almost the
entire remainder of its history (that is, apart from rare fluctuations into lower-entropy
states). Taken with enough grains of salt, we can summarize this in the slogan that an
irreversible (i.e. entropy increasing) process corresponds to an evolution from less likely
into more likely macrostates.
Notably, the time-reversal invariance of the microscopic laws implies that it cannot be
true that all microstates in a low-entropy macroregion ΓM1 evolve into states of higher
entropy. But microconditions leading to an entropy-decreasing evolution are atypical –
they form a subset of extremely small measure –, while nearly all microstates in ΓM1
evolve into states of higher entropy, i.e., entropy increase is typical.
The easy problem of irreversibility can be arbitrarily hard from a technical point
of view if one seeks to obtain rigorous mathematical results about the convergence to
equilibrium in realistic physical models. It is easy in the sense that, conceptually, Boltz-
mann’s account is well understood and successfully applied in physics and mathematics –
despite ongoing (but largely unnecessary) controversies and misconceptions in the philo-
sophical literature (see Bricmont (1999) and Lazarovici and Reichert (2015) for a more
detailed discussion and responses to common objections).
The hard problem begins with the question: Why do we find systems in low-entropy
states to begin with if these states are so unlikely? Often the answer is that we prepared
them, creating low-entropy subsystems for the price of increasing the entropy in their
environment. But why then is the entropy of this environment so low – most strikingly
in the sense that it allows us to exist? If one follows this rationale to the end, one
comes to the conclusion that the universe as a whole is in a state of low entropy (that
is, globally, in a spatial sense; we don’t just find ourselves in a low-entropy pocket in an
otherwise chaotic universe) and that this state must have evolved from a state of even
lower entropy in the distant past. The latter assumption is necessary to avoid the absurd
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conclusion that our present macrostate – which includes all our memories and records
of the past – is much more likely the product of a fluctuation out of equilibrium than
of the low-entropy past that our memories and records actually record. In other words:
only with this assumption does Boltzmann’s account “make it plausible not only that
the paper will be yellower and ice cubes more melted and people more aged and smoke
more dispersed in the future, but that they were less so (just as our experience tells us)
in the past.” (Albert (2015, p.5); for a good discussion of this issue see also Feynman
(1967, Ch. 5), Carroll (2010).)
In sum, the hard part of the problem of irreversibility is to explain the existence
of a thermodynamic arrow of time in our universe, given the fact that the universe is
governed, on the fundamental level, by reversible microscopic laws. And the standard
account today involves the postulate of a very special (since very low-entropy) initial
macrostate of the universe. Albert (2001) coined for this postulate the now famous term
Past Hypothesis (PH). But the status of the Past Hypothesis is highly controversial.
Isn’t the very low-entropy beginning of the universe itself a mystery in need of scientific
explanation?
In the next section, we will briefly recall this controversy and the various attitudes
taken towards the status of the PH. Section 3 then introduces recent ideas due to Sean
Carroll and Julian Barbour to explain the arrow of time without a Past Hypothesis,
namely as a feature of typical universes. In Section 4, we discuss if the Carroll model
can indeed ground sensible inferences about the past and future of our universe without
assuming something akin to the PH. Section 5 will propose a Boltzmann entropy for
Newtonian gravity, suggesting that a universe of N gravitating point particles provides
a relevant realization of Carroll’s entropy model. Section 6, finally, introduces the results
of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati that establishes an arrow of time in a relational for-
mulation of Newtonian gravity on “shape space”. We will work out potential advantages
of the relational theory and clarify the differences between the “gravitional arrow” of
Barbour et al. and the entropic arrow identified in the preceding section.
2 The controversy over the Past Hypothesis
So, the standard response to the hard part of the problem of irreversibility involves the
postulate of a very low-entropy beginning of our universe. But what is the status of this
Past Hypothesis? In the literature, by and large three different views have been taken
towards this issue.
1. The low-entropy beginning of the universe requires an explanation.
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2. The low-entropy beginning of the universe does not require, or allow, any further
explanation.
3. The Past Hypothesis is a law of nature (and therefore does not require or allow
any further explanation).
The first point of view is largely motivated by the fact that our explanation of the
thermodynamic arrow is based on a typicality reasoning (e.g. Lebowitz (1993), Goldstein
(2001), Lazarovici and Reichert (2015)). Assuming a low-entropy initial macrostate of
the universe, Boltzmann’s analysis allows us to conclude that typical microstates relative
to this macrostate will lead to a thermodynamic evolution of increasing entropy. It is
then not a good question to ask why the actual initial conditions of the universe were
among the typical ones. Once a fact about our universe – such as the existence of a
thermodynamic arrow – turns out to be typical, given the fundamental laws and the
relevant boundary conditions, there is nothing left to explain (except, possibly, for the
boundary conditions). On the flipside, atypical facts are usually the kind of facts that
cry out for further explanation. And to accept the PH is precisely to assume that the
initial state of our universe was atypical, relative to all possible microstates, in that it
belonged to an extremely small (i.e. very low-entropy) macroregion. Penrose (1999)
estimates the measure of this macroregion relative to the available phase space volume
to be at most 1 : 1010123 – a mind-bogglingly small number. Notably, the explanatory
pressure is mitigated by the fact that the PH entails only a special initial macrostate
rather than a microscopic fine-tuning. In the case of a gas in a box, this would be the
difference between atypical conditions that one can create with a piston and atypical
conditions that one could create only by controlling the exact position and momentum
of every single particle in the system. The point here is not that this makes it easier
for a hypothetical creator of the universe, but that only the latter (microscopic) kind of
fine-tuning gives rise to the worry that – given the huge number of microscopic degrees
of freedom and the sensitivity of the evolution to variations of the initial data – atypical
initial conditions could explain anything (and thus explain nothing; cf. Lazarovici and
Reichert (2015)). Nonetheless, the necessity of a PH implies that our universe looks very
different from a typical model of the fundamental laws of nature – and this is a fact that
one can be legitimately worried about.
The second point of view was in particular defended by Callender (2004). While
Callender is also sympathetic to the third option (regarding the PH as a law), he makes
the broader case that a) there is no single feature of facts – such as being atypical –
that makes them require explanation, and b) the conceivable explanations of the Past
Hypothesis aren’t much more satisfying than accepting it as a brute and basic fact.
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Figure 1: God picking out the special (low-entropy) initial conditions of our universe. Penrose (1999).
Notably, Ludwig Boltzmann himself eventually arrived at a similar conclusion:
The second law of thermodynamics can be proved from the mechanical theory
if one assumes that the present state of the universe, or at least that part
which surrounds us, started to evolve from an improbable state and is still in
a relatively improbable state. This is a reasonable assumption to make, since
it enables us to explain the facts of experience, and one should not expect to
be able to deduce it from anything more fundamental. (Boltzmann, 1897)
The third option, finally, is most prominently advocated by Albert (2001) and Loewer
(2007) in the context of the Humean Best System Account of laws. Upon their view, the
laws of nature consist in a) the microscopic dynamical laws b) the PH and c) a proba-
bility (or typicality) measure on the initial macroregion. This package has been dubbed
the “mentaculus” (Loewer, 2012). It is supposed to correspond to the best-system-laws
because it strikes the optimal balance between being simple and being informative about
the history of our universe (the “Humean mosaic”). In particular, adding b) and c) to
the microscopic laws comes at relatively little cost in terms of simplicity but makes the
system much more informative, precisely because it accounts for the thermodynamic
arrow of time and allows for probabilistic inferences. In addition, Albert (2001) and
Loewer (2007) employ the mentaculus in a sophisticated analysis of records, counterfac-
tuals, and more, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, it
is important to note that the proposition which Albert wants to grant the status of a law
is not that the universe started in any low-entropy state. The PH, in it’s current form, is
rather a placeholder for “the macrocondition ... that the normal inferential procedures
of cosmology will eventually present to us” (Albert, 2001, p. 96). Ideally (we suppose),
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physics will one day provide us with a nice and simple and informative characterization
of the initial boundary conditions of the universe – maybe something along the lines of
Penrose’s Weyl Curvate Conjecture (Penrose, 1999) – that would strike us as “law-like”.
But this is also what many advocates of option 1 seem to hope for as an “explanation”
of the PH. So while option 3 sounds like the most clear-cut conclusion about the status
of the PH, it is debatable to what extent it settles the issue. The more we have to rely
on future physics to fill in the details, the less is already accomplished by calling the
Past Hypothesis a law of nature.
3 Thermodynamic arrow without a Past Hypothesis
In recent years, Sean Carroll together with Jennifer Chen (2004; see also Carroll (2010)),
and Julian Barbour together with Tim Koslowski and Flavio Mercati (2013, 2014, 2015),
independently put forward audacious proposals to explain the arrow of time without a
Past Hypothesis. While Barbour’s arrow of time is not, strictly speaking, an entropic
arrow (but rather connected to a certain notion of complexity), Carroll’s account is
largely based on the Boltzmannian framework, although with a crucial twist. For this
reason, we shall focus on the Carroll account first, before comparing it to the theory of
Barbour et al. in Section 6.
The crucial assumption of Carroll and Chen is that the relevant stationary measure on
the phase space of the universe is unbounded, allowing for macrostates of arbitrarily high
entropy. Hence, every macrostate is a non-equilibrium state from which the entropy can
typically increase in both time directions, defining a thermodynamic arrow – or rather
two opposite ones – on either side of the entropy minimum. A typical entropy curve (one
hopes) would thus be roughly parabolic or “U-shaped”, attaining its global minimum at
some moment in time and growing monotonously (modulo small fluctuations) in both
directions of this vertex (Fig. 2). Barbour et al. (2015) describe such a profile as
“one-past-two-futures”, the idea being that observers on each branch of the curve would
identify the direction of the entropy minimum – which the authors name Janus point – as
their past. In other words, there are two future-eternal episodes making up the history
of the universe, with the respective arrows of time pointing in opposite directions.
The Carroll model is intriguing because it is based on the bold, yet plausible assump-
tion that the universe has no equilibrium state – a crucial departure from the “gas in the
box” paradigm that is still guiding most discussions about the thermodynamic history
of the universe. And it is particularly intriguing for anybody worried about the status
of the Past Hypothesis, because it seeks to establish the existence of a thermodynamic
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Figure 2: Typical entropy curve (with fluctuations and interpolated) for a Carroll universe. The arrows
indicate the arrow(s) of time on both sides of the “Janus point” (entropy minimum).
arrow in the universe as typical. This is in notable contrast to the standard account, in
which we saw that an entropy gradient is typical only under the assumption of atypical
– and time-asymmetric – boundary conditions.
Prima facie, it seems plausible that an eternal universe with unbounded entropy would
exhibit the U-shaped entropy profile shown in Fig. 2. For if we start in any macrostate,
the usual Boltzmannian arguments seem to suggest that typical microstates in the cor-
responding macroregion lead to a continuous increase of entropy in both time directions
(since there are always vastly larger and larger macroregions, corresponding to higher
and higher entropy values, that the microstate can evolve into). And then, any sensible
regularization of the phase space measure would allow us to conclude that a U-shaped
entropy profile is typical tout court, that is, with respect to all possible micro-histories.
However, if we assume, with Carroll, a non-normalizable measure – that assigns an
infinite volume to the total phase space and thus allows for an unbounded entropy –, the
details of the dynamics and the phase space partition must play a greater role than usual
in the Boltzmannian account. For instance, the measure of low-entropy macroregions
could sum up to arbitrarily (even infinitely) large values, exceeding those of the high-
entropy regions. Or the high-entropy macroregions could be arbitrarily far away in phase
space, so that the dynamics do not carry low-entropy configurations into high-entropy
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regions on relevant time-scales. The first important question we should ask is therefore:
Are there any interesting and realistic dynamics that give rise to typical
macro-histories as envisioned by Carroll and Chen?
The original idea of Carroll and Chen (2004) is as fascinating as it is speculative. The
authors propose a model of eternal spontaneous inflation in which new baby universes
(or “pocket universes”) are repeatedly branching off existing ones. The birth of a new
universe would then increase the overall entropy of the multiverse, while the baby uni-
verses themselves, growing from a very specific pre-existing state (a fluctuation of the
inflaton field in a patch of empty de-Sitter space), would typically start in an inflationary
state that has much lower entropy than a standard big bang universe. This means, in
particular, that our observed universe can look like a low-entropy universe, with an even
lower-entropy beginning, even when the state of the multiverse as a whole is arbitrarily
high up the entropy curve. The details of this proposal are beyond the scope of our
paper and do not (yet) include concrete dynamics or a precise definition of the entropy.
In more recent talks, Carroll discusses a simple toy model – essentially an ideal gas
without a box – in which a system of N free particles can expand freely in empty space.
The only macrovariable considered is the moment of inertia, I =
N∑
i=1
q2i , providing a
measure for the expansion of the system. It is then easy to see that I will attain a
minimal value at some moment in time t0, from which it grows to infinity in both time
directions (cf. equation (8) below). The same will hold for the associated entropy since
a macroregion, corresponding to a fixed value of I, is just a sphere of radius
√
I in the
position coordinates (while all momenta are constant). The entropy curve will thus have
the suggested U-shape with vertex at t = t0. A detailed discussion of this toy model can
be found in Reichert (2012), as well as Goldstein et al. (2016).
In this paper, we will not discuss these two models in any more detail. Instead, we are
going to argue in Section 5 that there exists a dynamical theory fitting Carroll’s entropy
model that is much less speculative than baby universes and much more interesting,
physically, than a freely expanding system of point particles. This theory is Newtonian
gravity. It will also allow us to draw interesting comparisons between the ideas of Carroll
and Chen and those of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati.
First, however, we want to address the question, whether this entropy model would
even succeed in explaining away the Past Hypothesis. Are typical macro-histories as
envisioned by Carroll and sketched in Fig. 2 sufficient to ground sensible inferences
about our past and future? Or would we still require – if not the PH itself, then a
close variant – an equally problematic assumption about the specialness of the observed
universe?
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4 The (dispensible) role of the Past Hypothesis
The question to be addressed in this section is thus the folllowing:
Can Carroll’s entropy model ground sensible statistical inferences about the
thermodynamic history of our universe without assuming (something akin
to) a Past Hypothesis?
To approach this issue, and clarify the role of the PH in the standard account, we have
to disentangle two questions that are often confounded in such discussions:
i) Given the fundamental laws of nature, what do typical macro-histories of the uni-
verse look like? In particular: is the existence of a thermodynamic arrow typical?
ii) Given our knowledge about the present state of the universe, what can we reasonably
infer about its past and future?
The answer to question i) will, in general, depend on the dynamical laws as well as cos-
mological considerations. If we have infinite time and a finite maximal entropy, a typical
macro-history will be in thermodynamic equilibrium almost all the time, but also exhibit
arbitrarily deep fluctuations into low-entropy states, leading to periods with a distinct
entropy gradient, i.e. a local thermodynamic arrow. This fluctuation scenario was in fact
Boltzmann’s initial response to the hard problem of irreversibility (Boltzmann, 1896).
However, to assume a fluctuation as the origin of our thermodynamic arrow is highly
unsatisfying, Feynman (1967, p. 115) even calls it “ridiculous”. The reason is that fluctu-
ations which are just deep enough to account for our present macrostate are much more
likely (and would thus occur much more frequently1) than fluctuations producing an
even lower-entropy past from which the current state could have evolved in accordance
with the second law. We would thus have to conclude that we are currently experiencing
the local entropy minimum, that our present state – including all our records and mem-
ories – is in fact the product of a random fluctuation rather than a lower-entropy past.
Feynman makes the further case that the fluctuation scenario leads not only to absurd
conclusions about the past, but to wrong ones about the present state of the universe,
as it compels us to assume that our current fluctuation is not any deeper – and hence
more unlikely – than necessary to explain the evidence we already have: If you dig in
the ground and find a dinosaur bone, you should not expect to find other bones nearby.
If you stumble upon a book about Napoleon, you should not expect to find other books
1e.g. in the sense lim sup
T→+∞
1
T
(
#fluctuations with entropy minimum ≈ S in the time-interval [−T, T ]
)
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containing the same information about a guy called Napoleon. The most extreme form
of this reductio ad absurdum is the Boltzmann brain problem (see e.g. Carroll (2010) for
a recent discussion): a fluctuation that is just deep enough to account for your empirical
evidence (many people claim) would produce only your brain, floating in space, with the
rest of the universe at equilibrium. You should thus conclude that this is, by far, the
most likely state of the universe you currently experience.
The only possible escape in such a fluctuation scenario is to involve the additional
postulate – a form of Past Hypothesis – that the present macrostate is not the bottom
of the fluctuation, but has been preceded by a sufficiently long period of entropy increase
from a state of much lower entropy, still. In this context, the PH would thus serve a self-
locating function, taking the form of an indexical proposition that locates our present
state on the upwards-slope of a particularly deep fluctuation (Fig. 3).
Figure 3: Self-location hypothesis in the fluctuation scenario (upper image) and big bang scenario
(lower image) with bounded entropy. Time-scales in the upper image are much larger than
below and periods of equilibrium are much longer than depicted.
The now standard account assumes a bounded entropy and a relatively young universe –
about 13.8 billion years according to estimates from modern big bang cosmology. In this
setting (we interpret the big bang as the actual beginning of time), a typical history would
not have any thermodynamic arrow at all (the time-scale of ∼ 1010 years is too short for
significant entropy fluctuations on cosmological scales). Thus, we need the PH to account
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for the existence of a thermodynamic arrow in the first place by postulating a low-
entropy boundary condition at the big bang. A self-locating proposition is still crucial
and hidden in the assumption of a young universe. Winsberg (2012) makes it explicit
in what he calls the “Near Past Hypothesis” (NPH), which is that our present state lies
between the low-entropy beginning of the universe and the time of first relaxation into
equilibrium. Without such an assumption – and assuming that the universe is eternal in
the future time direction – we would essentially be back in a fluctuation scenario with all
its Boltzmann-brain-like absurdities. In a future-eternal universe with bounded entropy,
there are still arbitrarily many entropy fluctuations that are just deep enough to account
for our present evidence (but not much deeper). And we would still have to conclude
that we are much more likely in one of these fluctuations than on the initial upwards
slope originating in the very low-entropy big bang (cf. also Loewer, forthcoming).
The self-locating role of the PH (which we take to include the NPH – for what would be
the point otherwise?) is thus indespensible. And it is, in fact, the indexical proposition
involved, rather than the non-dynamical boundary condition, that we would be surprised
to find among the fundamental laws of nature as we consider this option for the status
of the Past Hypothesis.
Carroll’s model, finally, postulates an eternal universe and unbounded entropy, sug-
gesting that typical macro-histories will have the U-shaped entropy profile depicted in
Fig. 2. If this works out – and we will argue that it does, but at least see no reason why
it couldn’t – the existence of a thermodynamic arrow (respectively two opposite ones)
will be typical. (For completeness, we could also discuss the option of a temporally finite
universe and unbounded entropy, but this model doesn’t seem advantageous and goes
beyond the scope of the paper.) In the upshot, the Carroll model can indeed explain the
existence of a thermodynamic arrow without invoking a PH as a fundamental postulate
over and above the microscopic laws and the pertinent typicality measure. It may still
turn out that the theory requires a PH for its self-locating function, if it would otherwise
imply that our current macrostate is the global entropy minimum, i.e. has not evolved
from a lower-entropy past. The relevant version of the PH may then take the form of
an indexical clause – stating that our present state is high up the entropy curve – or be
a characterization of the entropy minimum (Janus point) of our universe. (In the first
case, the PH would first and foremost locate the present moment within the history of
an eternal universe, in the latter, it would first and foremost locate the actual universe
within the set of possible ones.) But it is not obvious why the Carroll model would lead
to the conclusion that we are currently at (or near) the entropy minimum, and the issue
actually belongs to our second question – how to make inferences about the past – to
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which we shall now turn.
4.1 Predictions and Retrodictions
The most straightforward response to question ii) – how to make inferences about the
past or future – is the following method of statistical reasoning: Observe the current
state of the universe (respectively a suitably isolated subsystem), restrict the pertinent
probability (more correctly: typicality) measure to the corresponding macroregion in
phase space, and use the conditional measure to make probabilistic inferences about
the history of the system. We shall call this naive evidential reasoning (reviving a
terminology introduced in an unpublished 2011 draft of Goldstein et al., 2016). The
negative connotation is warranted because we know that while this kind of reasoning
works well for predictions – inferences about the future – it leads to absurd, if not
self-refuting, conclusions when applied for retrodictions – i.e. inferences about the past.
The now standard move to avoid this predicament is to employ the PH to block naive
evidential reasoning in the time direction of the low-entropy boundary condition. For
sensible retrodictions, we learn, one must conditionalize on the low-entropy initial state
in addition to the observed present state. It is rarely, if ever, noted that an appeal
to a PH may be sufficient but not necessary at this point. The key is to appreciate
that the second question – how to make inferences about the past and future of the
universe – must be addressed subsequently to the first – whether a thermodynamic
arrow in the universe is typical. For if we have good reasons to believe that we live in a
universe with a thermodynamic arrow of time, this fact alone is sufficient to conclude the
irrationality of retrodicting by conditionalizing the phase space measure on the present
macrostate. More precisely, it follows from the Boltzmannian analysis that in a system
with a thermodynamic arrow, the evolution towards the future (the direction of entropy
increase) looks like a typical one relative to any intermediate macrostate, while the actual
microstate is necessarily atypical with respect to its evolution towards the entropic past
(see Fig. 4). This is essentially the reversal of the familiar paradox that entropy increase
in both time directions comes out as typical relative to any non-equilibrium macrostate.
In the upshot, the fact that naive evidential reasoning doesn’t work towards the en-
tropic past can be inferred from the existence of a thermodynamic arrow; it does not
have to be inferred from the assumption of a special initial state. The explanation of
the thermodynamic arrow, in turn, may or may not require a special initial state, but
this was a different issue – discussed above.
If the relevant physical theory tells us that a thermodynamic arrow is typical, i.e.
exists in almost all possible universes, we have a very strong theoretical justification
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Figure 4: Typical microstates in the intermediate macroregion M1 =Mact evolve into a higher-entropy
region M2 in both time directions. Only a small subset of microstates (light grey area)
have evolved from the lower-entropy state M0 in the past; an equally small subset (shaded
area) will evolve into M0 in the future. The actual microstate (cross) has evolved from the
lower-entropy state in the past; only its future time-evolution corresponds to the typical one
relative to the macrostate Mact.
for believing that we actually live in a universe with a thermodynamic arrow. And if
we believe that we live in a universe with a thermodynamic arrow, a rational method
for making inferences about the past is not naive evidential reasoning but inference to
the best explanation. Rather than asking “what past state (or states) would be typical
given our present macrostate?”, we should ask “what past state (or states) would make
our present macrostate typical?”. In more technical terms, rather than adjusting our
credence that the past macrostate was M0 according to P(M0 |Mact), where Mact is our
present macrostate, we should “bet” on macrostates M0 that maximize P(Mact |M0). If
we find a dinosaur bone, we should infer a past state containing a dinosaur. If we find
history books with information about Napoleon, we should infer a past state containing
a French emperor by the name of Napoleon. We do not claim that this amounts to a
full-fledged analysis of the epistemic asymmetry, but it is a large enough part, at least, to
uphold the reliability of records and get a more fine-grained analysis going. In particular,
considering the universe as a whole, the fact that it has evolved from a lower-entropy
state in the past is inferred, rather than assumed, by this kind of abductive reasoning.
By now it should be clear that the debate is not about whether some version of the
PH is true, but about whether it is an axiom. And the upshot of our discussion is that if
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the existence of a thermodynamic arrow in the universe turns out to be typical, we can
consider our knowledge of the low-entropy past to be reasonably grounded in empirical
evidence and our best theory of the microscopic dynamics (as any knowledge about our
place in the history of the universe arguably should).
Another way to phrase the above analysis goes as follows: Naive evidential reason-
ing applied to both time directions will always lead to the conclusion that the current
macrostate is the (local) entropy minimum. However, if we know that we observe a
universe (or any other system) with a thermodynamic arrow, we also know that this
conclusion would be wrong almost all the time. More precisely, it would be wrong unless
we happened to observe a very special period in the history of the universe in which it
is close to its entropy minimum.
Goldstein, Tumulka, and Zanghì (2016) provide a mathematical analysis of this issue
in the context of Carroll’s toy model of freely expanding particles. Their discussion shows
that the two opposing ways of reasoning – typical microstates within a given macroregion
versus typical time-periods in a history characterized by a U-shaped entropy curve – come
down to different ways of regularizing the unbounded phase space measure by choosing
an appropriate cut-off. Goldstein et al. then argue against the first option, corresponding
to naive evidential reasoning, by saying that certain facts about the past amount to “pre-
theoretical” knowledge. In contrast, our arguments for the same conclusion are based
on a theoretical (Boltzmannian) analysis. Nonetheless, from a formal point of view, a
certain ambiguity remains. In Section 6, we will discuss how the relational framework
of Barbour et al. is able to improve upon this situation.
4.2 The mystery of our low-entropy universe
Another possible objection to the Carroll model (disregarding baby universes) goes as
follows: Doesn’t the fact that the entropy of the universe could be arbitrarily high make
its present very low value – and the even lower value at the Janus point – only more
mysterious? In other words: doesn’t the fact that the entropy could have been arbitrarily
high just increase the explanatory pressure to account for the specialness of the observed
universe? While we cannot completely deny the legitimacy of this worry, our intuition
is that the Carroll model precludes any a priori expectation of what the entropy of the
universe should be. If it can be arbitrarily (but not infinitely) large, any possible value
could be considered “mysteriously low” by skeptics.
Sidney Morgenbesser famously responded to the ontological question Why is there
something rather than nothing: “If there was nothing, you’d be still complaining!” In the
same spirit (though not quite as witty), our reaction to the question Why is the entropy
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of the universe so low? would be: “If it was any higher, you’d be still complaining!”
We concede, nonetheless, that divergent intuitions about this question are possible. In
fact, the ambiguity is once again paralleled by mathematical issues arising from the non-
normalizability of the phase space measure. Note that when Penrose (1999) estimates
that the entropy of the universe near the big bang could have been about 10123 times
higher, the worry is not that the actual value was so low in comparison, but that a
10123 times higher entropy would seem 1010123 times as likely. While this conclusion is
questionable even in the standard Boltzmannian framework (with a finite phase space
volume), the interpretation of a non-normalizable phase space measure as a probability
measure is problematic, to say the least, leading in particular to the paradox that any
finite range of entropy values has probability zero. Again, we’ll have to leave it at that
as far as the discussion of the Carroll model is concerned, explaining instead in the last
section how the shape space theory of Barbour et al. is able to resolve the issue. First,
though, we owe the reader some evidence that we have not been talking about the empty
set, but that Newtonian gravity might actually provide a relevant example of a Carroll
universe.
5 Entropy of a classical gravitating system
There is a lot of confusion and controversy about the statistical mechanics of classical
gravitating systems, despite the fact that statistical methods are commonly and suc-
cessfully used in areas of astrophysics that are essentially dealing with the Newtonian
N -body problem (see e.g. Heggie and Hut (2003)). (An excellent paper clearing up
much of the confusion is Wallace (2010); see Callender (2009) for some problematic as-
pects of the statistical mechanics of gravitating systems and Padmanabhan (1990) for a
mathematical treatment.) Some examples of common claims are:
a) Boltzmann‘s statistical mechanics is not applicable to systems in which gravity is the
dominant force.
b) The Boltzmann entropy of a classical gravitating system is ill-defined or infinite.
c) An entropy increasing evolution for a gravitating system is exactly opposite to that
of an ideal gas. While the tendency of the latter is to expand into a uniform config-
uration, the tendency of the former is to clump into one big cluster.
We believe that the first two propositions are simply false, while the third is at least
misleading. However, rather than arguing against these claims in the abstract, we will
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provide a demonstration to the contrary by proposing an analysis of a classical gravitat-
ing system in the framework of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics.
We start by looking at the naive calculation, along the lines of the standard textbook
computation for an ideal gas, that finds the Boltzmann entropy of the classical gravitat-
ing system to be infinite (see e.g. Kiessling (2001)). For simplicity, we always assume
N particles of equal mass m. We have
S(E,N, V ) := kB log|Γ(E,N, V )| = kB log
[ 1
h3NN !
∫
V N
∫
R3N
δ
(
H − E) d3Nq d3Np], (2)
with
H(N)(q, p) =
N∑
i=1
p2i
2m −
∑
1≤i<j≤N
Gm2
|qi − qj | (3)
and
∫
V N
∫
R3N
δ
(
H − E) d3Np d3Nq = C ∫
V N
(
E +
∑
i<j
Gm2
|qi − qj |
) 3N−2
2
d3Nq = +∞. (4)
For N > 2, the integral (4) diverges due to the singularity of the gravitational potential
at the origin. Note that in the present context, there are no physical boundaries (i.e. no
box) confining the particles to a given volume. The macrovariable V rather describes
a volume (e.g. the smallest sphere, or cuboid, or convex set) enclosing the particle
configuration in empty space.
There is nothing mathematically wrong with the above calculation, it just doesn’t
actually compute what it’s supposed to. One problem is that as we integrate over V N ,
we sum over all possible configurations of N particles (with total energy E) within
the volume V . This includes configurations in which the particles are homogeneously
distributed, but also configurations in which most particles are concentrated in a small
subset of V (Fig. 5). In the case of the ideal gas in a box, the contribution of the latter
is negligible since almost the entire phase space volume is concentrated on spatially
homogeneous configurations. It is the entropy (or phase space volume) of this equilibrium
state that we actually want to compute, and the mistake we make by including non-
equilibrium configurations (in which the particles are concentrated in one half, or one
quarter or one third, etc. of the volume) is so small that it is hardly ever mentioned.
In the case of a gravitating system, the situation is distinctly different, since the
spatial configuration is correlated with the kinetic energy or, in other words, with the
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Figure 5: Performing the volume integral in (4), we sum over all possible configurations of the particles
within the given volume V .
possible momentum configurations of the system. Simply put, for an attractive potential
and constant energy, a more concentrated spatial configuration corresponds to higher
kinetic energy and thus larger phase space volume in the momentum variables. The
“total volume” V is thus not a good macrovariable to describe a system with gravity. In
particular, if we want to know whether the entropy of a gravitating system is increasing
as the configuration clusters, we have to consider a macroscopic variable that actually
distinguishes between more and less clustered configurations (as those shown in Fig. 5).
We thus propose to describe a system of N gravitating point particles by the following
set of macrovariables:
• E(p, q) = p22m + V (q) =
N∑
i=1
p2i
2m −
∑
1≤i<j≤N
Gm2
|qi−qj | is the total energy of the system
which is a constant of motion.
• I(q) =
N∑
i=1
m(qi −
N∑
j=1
qj)2 is the moment of inertia that will quantify how much
the particles are spread out over space. In the center of mass frame – which we can
and will use without loss of generality –, it simplifies to I(q) = mq2 = ∑Ni=1mq2i .
Recall that the system is not confined by physical boundaries but can expand
arbitrarily in empty space (I can grow arbitrarily).
The moment of inertia alone is still too coarse to differentiate between, let’s say, a
uniform configuration and a concentrated cluster with few residual particles far away.
To distinguish between more and less clustered configurations, we thus have to introduce
a further macrovariable. We choose:
• U(q) := −V (q) = ∑
1≤i<j≤N
Gm2
|qi−qj | , which is just the absolute value of the potential
energy. Since the total energy is E(q, p) = T (p) + V (q), specifying the value of
E and U is equivalent to specifying E and the kinetic energy T (p) =
N∑
i=1
p2i
2m . An
increase of U(q) thus signifies both clustering and heating of the system.
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Note that defining macrostates in terms of U (respectively the potential energy)
automatically takes care of the ultraviolet divergence in the computation of the
associated entropy since the minimal particle distance r is bounded as r ≥ Gm2U .
Obviously, we do not claim that the moment of inertia or the gravitational poential
energy of the universe can be precisely measured. What makes them macrovariables
is, first and foremost, the fact that they are coarse-graining: many different micro-
configurations of an N -particle universe realize the same values of I and U . Moreover,
in the next subsection, it will become clearer that the evolution of these macrovariables
does indeed provide relevant information about the large-scale structure of a gravitating
universe.
Now, to determine the entropy of the respective macrostates, we have to compute the
phase space volume corresponding to a macroregion Γ(E, I, U), that is
|Γ(E, I, U)| =
∫∫
R3N×R3N
δ
( p2
2m + V (q)− E
)
δ
(
V (q) + U
)
δ
(
mq2 − I
)
d3Nq d3Np (5)
for fixed values of E, I, and U . Unfortunately, we weren’t able to solve this integral
analytically (and maybe this is, in fact, impossible). However, if we replace the sharp
values of the macrovariables with a small interval I(q) ∈ (I − ∆I, I + ∆I), |V (q)| ∈
(U −∆U,U + ∆U) with e.g. ∆I = I√
N
,∆U = U√
N
(roughly a standard deviation), we
can obtain the bounds:
C(E +U)
3N−2
2 I
3N−3
2
(Gm2
U
)3
e−4N ≤ |Γ(E,U ±∆U, I ±∆I)| ≤ C(E +U) 3N−22 I 3N2 e3
√
N ,
for sufficiently large values of I and U (more precisely, of the dimensionless quantity√
IU
Gm5/2
) and E ≥ 0, where C is a positive constant depending only on N and m. A
precise statement and proof (valid for any E) is given in the appendix. Thus, we have
|Γ(E,U, I)| ≈ const. · (I(E + U)) 3N2 , (6)
and ignoring an additive constant
S(E, I, U) ≈ 3N2
(
log(E + U) + log(I)
)
. (7)
5.1 Typical evolutions
We now provide a discussion of this result.
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1. With our choice of macrovariables, the associated Boltzmann entropy of a grav-
itating system is well-defined and finite. We also see that the entropy can grow
without bounds, either due to continuous expansion of the system (I → +∞)
and/or due to continuous clustering and self-heating (U → +∞).
2. While common wisdom says that the typical evolution of a gravitating system is one
of clumping and clustering, our computation shows that clustering and expansion
(as quantified by the macrovariable U and I, respectively) can contribute equally
to an increase of entropy. This fits well with the observed processes of gravithermal
collapse that are known to show a “core-halo” pattern (see e.g. Heggie and Hut
(2003, Ch. 23)): the configuration of masses splits into a core that collapses and
heats up (increase of U) and a collection of particles on the outskirts that are
blown away (increase of I).
On even larger (cosmological) scales, a gravitating system in a homogeneous con-
figuration can increase its entropy along both “dimensions” by forming many local
clusters (“galaxies”) that disperse away from each other – a process that would
look very much like structure formation!
Hence, it seems to be precisely the interplay between the opposing tendencies of
clustering and expansion that makes classical gravity much more interesting, from
a thermodynamic point of view, than often assumed.
3. Analytical and numerical results support the conclusion that the typical evolution
of a gravitating system is one in which the entropy (7) increases from a minimum
value in both time directions, giving rise to the U-shaped entropy curves proposed
by Carroll and Chen. The first analytical result is the classical Lagrange-Jacobi
equation for the gravitational potential:
I¨ = 4E − 2V. (8)
From this equation, which is a standard result in analytical mechanics, it follows
immediately that if E ≥ 0, the second time derivative of the moment of inertia is
strictly positive (note that V is negative), meaning that I(t) is a strictly convex
(upwards curving) function. Together with the fact that I → ∞ as t → ±∞
(Pollard, 1967), we can conclude that the graph of I has precisely the kind of
U-shape that we expect for the entropy.
Thanks to the results of Saari (1971) and Marchal and Saari (1974), we have an
even more precise picture of the asymptotic behavior of the Newtonian gravita-
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tional N -particle system. Their work studies the inter-particle distances |qi − qj |,
as well as the dispersion from the center of mass, for t → ∞ independent of the
total energy. It is found that either the minimal particle distance goes to zero
lim
t→∞ r(t) := limt→∞mini 6=j |qi(t)− qj(t)| = 0,
while the greatest particle distance goes to infinity faster than t
lim
t→∞
R(t)
t
:= lim
t→∞ t
−1 max
i 6=j
|qi(t)− qj(t)| =∞,
or the asymptotic behavior in the center-of-mass frame is characterized by
qi(t) = Ait+O(t2/3) ∀i = 1, . . . , N and lim sup
t→∞
r > 0, (9)
where Ai ∈ R3 are constant vectors (possibly the zero vector). Note that since the
dynamics are time-reversal invariant, the results hold for t→ −∞, as well.
The first case describes so-called “super-hyperbolic escape”. This scenario is con-
sistent with an increase of our gravitational entropy (7), implying both I → ∞
and U → ∞ as t → ∞. It also includes, however, the pathological cases in which
solutions diverge in finite time. It is the second case (when super-hyperbolic escape
is excluded), in which the Newtonian N -body system is much more interesting and
generally well-behaved. More precisely, we see that if (9) holds, all inter-particle
distances fall into one of the following three classes (see Saari (1971), Cor. 1.1,
together with Marchal and Saari (1974), Cor. 6):
|qi − qj | = Lijt+O(t2/3), (10)
or
|qi − qj | = O(t2/3) (11)
or
|qi − qj | ≤ L (12)
for large t and positive constants L,Lij .
The result can be summarized as follows (cf. Saari (1971), p. 227): On sufficiently
large time-scales, the system forms clusters, consisting of particles whose mutual
distances remain bounded. These clusters form subsystems (clusters of clusters)
that are reasonably well isolated (energy and angular momentum are asymptoti-
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cally conserved in each one of them separately), the distance between their centers
of mass growing proportional to t. Finally, within each of these subsystems, the
clusters separate approximately as t2/3. In other words, the long-term behavior
of such a Newtonian universe looks very much like structure formation, with local
clumping into “galaxies” and global expansion due to galaxies and galaxy clus-
ters receding from each other. Even quantitatively, the result fits reasonably well
with the behavior of our actual universe: identifying a “scale factor” a(t) with the
typical inter-galaxy distance, we find H(t) = a˙a ∼ t−1 for large t, consistent with
Hubble’s law for a universe dominated by matter and/or radiation.
In regard to entropic considerations, i.e. equation (7), we note that the moment
of inertia will grow asymptotically like I(t) ∼ t2, while the macrovariable U(t) is
at least bounded from below by some multiple of N
L2 (assuming that the number
of particles in a cluster is of order N). What happens at intermediate times?
Assuming henceforth a non-negative total energy, we already know that I(t) is
strictly convex. Together with its quadratic growth for t→ ±∞, we can conclude
that it has a unique global minimum, let’s say at t = τ , from which it increases
in both time directions. U(t) will in general fluctuate, but if we exclude parti-
cle collisions and “near particle collisions” (very close encounters), it will remain
bounded and not fluctuate too quickly (U˙ remains bounded, as well). Hence, we
expect that the graph of (E +U(t))I(t) (the logarithm of which is proportional to
our gravitational entropy) looks qualitatively like that of I(t), namely by and large
parabolic. Indeed, numerical simulations by Barbour et al. (2013, 2015) for the
E = 0 universe (with N = 1000 and random initial data) support the claim that
the evolution of I · U is well interpolated by a parabola of the form α(t− τ)2 + β
with α, β > 0. All this suggests the desired U-shaped evolution of the entropy
S(E, I, U) ≈ 3N2
(
log(E + U) + log(I)
)
as a function of time for a Newtonian
gravitating universe with non-negative energy. (Actually, on large time-scales, the
shape looks less like a U and more like g – how some children draw birds on the
horizon – since S(t) grows only logarithmically as |t− τ | → ∞.)
We conclude that a Newtonian gravitating universe is indeed a “Carroll universe” which
has no equilibrium state and for which entropy increase (in opposite directions from a
global minimum) is typical. This entropy increase is, moreover, consistent with structure
formation. It does not merely lead to a big boring clump of matter.
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6 Gravity and typicality from a relational point of view
Starting from Machian / Leibnizian principles, Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati (2013,
2014, 2015) discuss the Newtonian gravitational system from a relationalist perspective.
According to the relational framework that Julian Barbour has championed over the
past decades, all physical degrees of freedom are described on shape space S which
is obtained from Newtonian configuration space by factoring out absolute rotations,
translations, and scale, leaving us with a 3N − 7 dimensional space for an N -particle
system. The configuration of N point particles is then characterized by the angles and
ratios between their (Euclidean) distance vectors – or, in other words, by its shape –
independent of extrinsic scales. The lowest-dimensional shape space is that of N = 3
particles. In this case, the shapes are those of triangles – specified by 2 angles or the
ratios between 3 distances – and the topology of shape space is that of a 2-dimensional
(projective) sphere.
Considering standard Newtonian gravity on absolute space and trying to extract, so
to speak, its relational essence, we have to eliminate all dependencies on extrinsic spatio-
temporal structures. To this end, we restrict ourselves to models with vanishing total
momentum, P = ∑Ni=1 pi ≡ 0, and angular momentum, L = ∑Ni=1 qi×pi ≡ 0, excluding
rotating universes and propagations of the center of mass, respectively.2 Furthermore,
the rejection of absolute time-scales leads to considering only universes with zero total
energy (E ≡ 0), since this is the only value invariant under a rescaling of time-units.
The problematic issue when it comes to Newtonian gravity is its lack of scale-invariance.
Newtonian gravity has models that do not rotate (L ≡ 0) and models that do not propa-
gate (P ≡ 0) but it does not have models that do not expand (D := 12 I˙ =
∑N
i=1 qi·pi ≡ 0;
Barbour calls D the dilatational momentum). The characteristic size of an N -particle
system is given by σ =
√
I
m , where I = m
N∑
i=1
q2i is the center-of-mass moment of in-
ertia, and we have already seen that I can never be constant for non-negative energy
(equation (8)) but is roughly parabolic as a function of time. In other words: an N -
particle universe interacting by Newton’s law of gravity always changes in size.3 Of
course, we can (and will) insist that this is meaningless from a relational point of view –
2Arbitrary solutions of Newtonian mechanics can be projected onto shape space, but the total angular
momentum (let’s say) cannot be captured by relational initial data. It corresponds to a particular
choice of absolute spatio-temporal reference frame (“gauge”) in the shape space theory; cf. Dürr et al.
(2018). L = 0 is then the only canonical choice, and the only one suggested by Machian principles.
3In fact, the general Lagrange-Jacobi identity shows that E = 0 and I ≡ const. is possible only if the
potential is homogeneous of degree −2. This had motivated the alternative, scale-invariant theory
of gravitation proposed in Barbour (2003). Here, we discuss the relational formulation of Newtonian
gravity with the familiar 1
r
-potential.
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since absolute distance is meaningless – but the process has nonetheless dynamical (and
thus empirical) consequences in Newtonian theory. Simply put: for constant energy,
a gravitating system that expands also slows down.4 Conversely, if we eliminate scale
by hand, namely by a time-dependent coordinate transformation q → qσ(t) , the result-
ing dynamics can be formulated on shape space, but will no longer have the standard
Newtonian form. Instead, the dynamics become non-autonomous (time-dependent) with
scale acting essentially like friction (Barbour et al., 2014).
How to capture this time-dependence without reference to external time? Barbour
et al. make use of the fact that the dilatational momentum D = 12 I˙ is monotonously
increasing (I¨ > 0 by equation (8)) and can thus be used as an internal time-parameter,
a kind of universal clock. In particular, we observe that D = 0 precisely when I reaches
its global minimum. This central time thus marks the mid-point between a period of
contraction and a period of expansion, or better (though this remains to be justified):
the Janus point between two periods of expansion with respect to opposite arrows of
time. It provides, in particular, a natural reference point for parametrizing solutions of
the shape space theory in terms of mid-point data on the shape phase space T ∗S.5
There is one last redundancy from the relational point of view that Barbour et al.
(2015) call dynamical similarity. It comes from the invariance of the equations of motion
under a simultaneous rescaling of internal time D and shape momenta. More simply put:
two solution trajectories are physically identical if they correspond to the same geometric
curve in shape space, the same sequence of shapes, even if that curve is run through at
different “speeds”. Thus, factoring out the absolute magnitude of the shape momenta
at central time, we reduce the relevant phase space (that parametrizes solutions) by one
further dimension. The resulting space PT ∗S (mathematically, this is the projective
cotangent bundle of shape space S) is compact, which means, in particular, that it has
a finite total volume according to the uniform volume measure. And this is where the
relational formulation, i.e. the elimination of absolute degrees of freedom, really starts
to pay off. Since the uniform measure on PT ∗S, that Barbour et al. take to be the
natural typicality measure, following Laplace’s principle of indifference, is normalizable,
it allows for a statistical analysis that avoids the ambiguities resulting from the infinite
phase space measure in the Carroll model. It should be noted that the construction of
the measure is not entirely canonical; it involves the choice of a metric on shape space
4Compare: absolute rotations are meaningless on shape space, but centrifugal forces would be observ-
able through their effect on the particle motions; cf. Maudlin (2012) for an excellent discussion of
this issue going back to the famous Leibniz-Clarke debate.
5Mathematically, this is the cotangent bundle of shape space S, just as Hamiltonian phase space is the
cotangent bundle of Newtonian configuration space.
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(which, in turn, can be defined through a scale-invariant metric on absolute phase space).
In general, the justification of the typicality measure remains a critical step that would
require a more in-depth discussion.6 For instance, we are rather skeptical of a “principle
of indifference” as a motivation for a uniform measure. For the time being, we just take
the pragmatic attitude that the typicality measure proposed by Barbour, Koslowski, and
Mercati will be justified by its empirical and explanatory success. Deviating from their
notation, we denote this measure on the reduced phase space by µε.
6.1 Shape complexity and the gravitational arrow
To describe the macro-evolution of a gravitating system on shape space, Barbour and
collaborators introduce a dimensionless (scale-invariant) macrovariable CS which they
call shape complexity:
CS = −V ·
√
I. (13)
Comparison with (6) (setting E = 0 and remembering that U = −V ) shows a remark-
able relationship between this shape complexity and the gravitational entropy that we
computed on absolute phase space. Recalling our previous discussion (or noting that
CS ≈ R/r, where R is the largest and r the smallest distance between particles), we
also see that low shape complexity corresponds to dense homogeneous states in abso-
lute space, while high shape-complexity indicates “structure” – dilute configurations of
multiple clusters.
On shape space, considering the simplest case of N = 3 particles, the configuration of
minimal shape complexity is the equilateral triangle, while the configuration of maximal
shape complexity corresponds to “binary coincidences” in which the distance between
two particles – relative to their distance to the third – is zero. This is to say that 3-
particle configurations with high shape complexity will, in general, contain a Kepler pair
(a gravitational bound state of two particles) with the third particle escaping to infinity.
In Section 5.1, we have discussed the typical evolution of −V · I and found it to be
roughly parabolic or U-shaped. Analogously, one can conclude that the evolution of
CS = −V ·
√
I (in Newtonian time) will typically exhibit a V-shaped profile: it has a
global minimum at central time (D = 0), from which it grows roughly linearly (modulo
fluctuations) in both time directions. In the terminology of Barbour, Koslowski, and
Mercati, this defines two opposite gravitational arrows of time with the Janus point
as their common past. Note that these are not entropic arrows, though our previous
6Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì (2018) provide an insightful discussion of typicality measures on shape
space, though focussing on the quantum case.
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discussion strongly suggests that the evolution of the shape complexity on shape space
will align with the evolution of the gravitational entropy (7) on absolute space.
A remarkable feature of the relational theory, however, is that it reveals the origin
of the gravitational arrow to be dynamical rather than statistical: the negative of the
shape complexity corresponds to the potential that generates the gravitational dynamics
on shape space. There is thus a dynamical tendency towards higher values of CS (lower
values of the shape potential). In contrast, Boltzmannian statistical mechanics suggests
that entropy increase is typical because there are a great many more high-entropy than
low-entropy configurations that a system could evolve into. It does not suggest that
physical forces are somehow driving the system towards higher entropy states.
Figure 6: Top: evolution of the shape complexity CS found by numerical simulation for N = 1000 and
Gaussian initial data. Bottom: schematic conception (not found by numerical simulation) of
three corresponding configurations on Newtonian space-time. Source: Barbour et al. (2015).
Turning to the statistical analysis of the shape space theory, we are interested in
the measure assigned to mid-point data (Janus point configurations) with low shape
complexity
CS ∈ [Cmin, α · Cmin] := I1, (14)
respectively high shape complexity
CS ∈ (α · Cmin,∞) := I∞. (15)
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Here, 1 < α  ∞ is some positive constant and Cmin is the smallest possible value of
CS . The key result of the relational statistical analysis (not yet rigorously proven but
strongly substantiated by the 3-particle case and numerical experiments for large N) is
now that already for small values of α (α < 2 for large N)
µε(I∞)
µε(PT ∗S)
≈ 0, (16)
and consequently
µε(I1)
µε(PT ∗S)
≈ 1. (17)
This means: it is typical that a universe at the Janus point (the beginning of our macro-
history) is in a very homogeneous state!
Regardless of the philosophical merits of relationalism, the shape space theory of
Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati thus comes with two great virtues: First, it provides a
sensible normalizable measure on the set of possible micro-evolutions that still establishes
an arrow of time as typical. Even more spectacularly, typical evolutions with respect to
this measure go through very homogeneous configurations at their Janus point (∼ the
“big bang”). In other words, initial states that have very low entropy from the absolutist
point of view come out as typical in the shape space description – provided that one
accepts the proposed measure on PT ∗S as a natural typicality measure. This would
resolve the two potential problems that we have identified for the Carroll model: the
mysteriously low entropy of our universe and the justification for locating our present
state reasonably far away from the entropy minimum.
6.2 Entaxy and Entropy
On the other hand, Barbour et al. introduce another concept called (instantaneous)
entaxy that we find much less compelling. The instantaneous entaxy (the authors also
use the term solution entaxy for the measure µε on PT ∗S) is supposed to be the measure
of a set of shape configurations corresponding to a given value of shape complexity. It
thus seems prima facie analogous to the Boltzmann entropy defined in terms of the
macrovariable CS , with the notable exception that it decreases in time as the shape
complexity increases. Recall, however, that the measure µε was only defined on mid-
point data, so to speak by cutting through the set of solution trajectories at their Janus
points. Barbour et al. now extend it to arbitrary (internal) times by saying: the entaxy
associated with a particular value of shape complexity at any point in history is the
measure of mid-point configurations with that value of shape complexity.
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This definition seems somewhat ad hoc and corresponds to comparing macrostates at
different times in terms of a measure that is not stationary under the dynamics: A set of
mid-point data will have a bigger size than the set of time-evolved configurations (phase
space volume gets lost, so to speak). Indeed, on the 3-particle shape space, it is not hard
to see that the points of maximal shape complexity are dynamical attractors; hence, a
stationary continuous measure on shape phase space does not exist. In general, it is not
even clear if a stationary measure is a meaningful concept in relational mechanics since
there is no absolute (metaphysical) sense in which configurations on different solution
trajectories with the same internal time are actually simultaneous. They merely happen
to agree on whatever part or feature of the configuration plays the role of an internal
“clock”. For all these reasons, the entaxy should not be regarded as a shape analogon
of the Boltzmann entropy (which is always defined in terms of a stationary measure).
In particular, the fact that the gravitational arrows point in the direction of decreasing
rather than increasing entaxy is not in contradiction with Boltzmannian arguments.
Finally, one may wonder whether we could compute on absolute phase space the Boltz-
mann entropy associated to the shape complexity or other scale-invariant macrovariables.
Note that for E = 0, our gravitational entropy (7) is a function of −V I. Couldn’t we
have just computed an entropy for the macrovariable CS = −V
√
I, instead? Inter-
estingly, the answer is negative and the reason is the following simple result, showing
that macroregions defined by scale-invariant macrovariables would have measure zero or
infinity.
Lemma 6.1. Let µ be a measure on Ω that is homogeneous of degree d, i.e. µ(λA) =
λdµ(A) for any measurable A ⊂ Ω and λ > 0. Let F : Ω→ Rn be a measurable function
homogeneous of degree k, i.e. F (λx) = λkF (x) ∀x ∈ Ω. Then we have for any interval
I ⊂ Rn (possibly consisting of a single point):
µ
(
{x | F (x) ∈ λkI}
)
= λdµ
(
{x | F (x) ∈ I}
)
. (18)
Proof.
µ ({x | F (x) ∈ I}) = µ
(
{x | F (λx) ∈ λkI}
)
= µ
(
{λ−1y | F (y) ∈ λkI}
)
= λ−dµ
(
{x | F (x) ∈ λkI}
)
.
From this, we can immediately conclude:
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Corollary 6.2. If the measure µ is homogeneous of degree d 6= 0 and F is homogeneous
of degree 0 (i.e. scale-invariant), then
µ
(
F−1(I)
)
∈ {0,+∞}. (19)
Proof. Applying equation (18) with k = 0 and d 6= 0 yields µ (F−1(I)) = λdµ (F−1(I))
for any λ > 0.
Hence, using a homogeneous phase space measure (such as the Liouville measure or the
microcanonical measure for a homogeneous potential and E = 0) macroregions defined
in terms of scale-invariant macrovariables must have measure zero or infinity, so that the
corresponding Boltzmann entropy would be ill-defined. This suggests that the concept of
entropy is intimately linked to absolute scales and thus not manifestly relational. Note,
in particular, that expansion and heating – processes that are paradigmatic for entropy
increase (especially, but not exclusively in our analysis of gravitating systems) – require
absolutes scales of distance and velocity, respectively.
This emphasizes once again that the gravitational arrow of Barbour et al. is not an
entropic arrow, although it matches – maybe accidentally, maybe for reasons we don’t yet
understand – the entropic arrow that we identified on absolute phase space. The result
also leaves the relationalist with the following interesting dilemma: Either the notion of
entropy is meaningful only for subsystems – for which the environment provides extrinsic
scales – or we have to explain why the entropy of the universe is a useful and important
concept despite the fact that it is related to degrees of freedom that are strictly speaking
unphysical, corresponding to mere gauge in the shape space theory.
7 Conclusion
The works of Carroll and Chen as well as Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati show that it
is possible to establish an arrow of time as typical, without the need to postulate special
boundary conditions or any other form of Past Hypothesis. By proposing the definition
of a Boltzmann entropy for a classical gravitating universe, we argued that Newtonian
gravity provides a relevant realization of Carroll’s entropy model that can be compared
to the shape space formulation of Barbour et al. We found, in particular, that the grav-
itational arrows identified by Barbour and collaborators in terms of shape complexity
will match the entropic arrows in the theory on absolute space. The extension to other
microscopic theories (and/or macroscopic state functions) will require further research.
The relationalist and the absolutist approach both provide the resources to avoid the
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reversibility paradox and ground sensible inferences about the past and future of the
universe. However, while certain ambiguities remain in the Carroll model, resulting
from the non-normalizability of the phase space measure, those issues are resolved by
the shape space theory of Barbour et al. – provided one accepts their choice of typical-
ity measure. In any case, for a Newtonian gravitating universe, their analysis suggests
that homogeneous configurations at the “big bang” (Janus point) are typical, explaining
why the universe started in what looks like a very low entropy state from an absolutist
perspective. However, if the shape space theory is actually fundamental, the “entropy
of the universe” turns out to be a somewhat spurious concept whose status remains to
be discussed in more detail.
Acknowledgements: We thank Julian Barbour, Detlef Dürr, Valia Allori, and two
anonymous referees for valuable comments.
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Appendix: Computation of the gravitational entropy
We compute the phase space volume of the macroregion Γ(E, I ± I, U ± U), that is:
1
N !h3N
∫
d3Np
∫
d3Nq δ
(
H(q,p)− E)
1
{
(1− )U ≤
∑
i<j
i,j=1
Gm2
|qi − qj |
≤ (1 + )U
}
1
{
(1− )I ≤
N∑
i=1
mq2i ≤ (1 + )I
}
,
(20)
with the Hamiltonian
H(q, p) =
N∑
i=1
p2i
2m −
∑
1≤i<j≤N
Gm2
|qi − qj | .
We shall prove the following
Proposition. If the scale invariant quantity
√
IU is large enough that
√
IU ≥ 4Gm5/2 log(N)N5/2 , (21)
we obtain the bounds:
|Γ(E, I ± I, U ± U)| ≥ CN2 e− 72N
(Gm2
U
)3
(E + (1− )U) 3N−22
( I
m
) 3N−3
2
,
|Γ(E, I ± I, U ± U)| ≤ 2C3N [e
3N
2 − 1] (E + (1 + )U) 3N−22
( I
m
) 3N
2
,
for any  > 2N and N ≥ 4, where C = (2m)
3N−2
2
2·N !h3N [Ω
3N−1]2, with Ω3N−1 the surface
element of the (3N − 1)-dimensional unit sphere.
For non-negative E, this can be simplified further by using (E+(1+)U)n ≤ (1+)n(E+
U)n ≤ en(E + U)n, respectively (E + (1− )U)n ≥ (1− )n(E + U)n ≥ e−2n(E + U)n,
for  < 12 .
Proof. We first perform the integral over the momentum variables and are left with
(2m) 3N−22
2N !h3N Ω
3N−1
∫
d3Nq
(
E +
∑
i<j
Gm2
|qi − qj |
) 3N−2
2
1
{
(1− )U ≤
∑
i<j
i,j=1
Gm2
|qi − qj |
≤ (1 + )U
}
1
{
(1− )I ≤
N∑
i=1
mq2i ≤ (1 + )I
}
.
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From this, it is straightforward to obtain the upper bound:
(20) ≤ (2m)
3N−2
2
2N !h3N Ω
3N−1 2Ω3N−1
3N (E + (1 + )U)
3N−2
2
[(
(1 + ) I
m
) 3N
2 − ((1− ) I
m
)
3N
2
]
≤ C3N [e
3N
2 − 1](E + (1 + )U) 3N−22 ( I
m
) 3N
2
,
where we used (1 + )N = elog(1+)N ≤ eN .
For the lower bound, we consider the set B := B1 × . . .×BN ⊂ R3N defined by
Bj :=
{|qj | ∈ [(2j − 2)ξ, (2j − 1)ξ]},
with ξ = ξ(I,N) to be determined soon. That is, we consider a series of concentric
spheres around the origin, their radii being an increasing multiple of ξ, and configurations
for which the volume between two spheres is alternately empty or occupied by a single
particle. For B, we have mq2 ∈ [I+ −∆I, I+] with
I+ =
N∑
i=2
mq2i ≤ m
N∑
i=2
(2i− 1)2ξ2 = m3 N(4N
2 − 1)ξ2 (22)
and
∆I = m
N∑
i=1
[(2i− 1)2 − (2i− 2)2]ξ2 = m
N∑
i=1
[4i− 3]ξ2 ≤ 2mN2ξ2 ≤ 2
N
I+.
We thus set
ξ :=
√
3I
mN(4N2 − 1) , (23)
so that I+ = I.
Furthermore, for q ∈ B, the distance between two particles is bounded from below by
|qi− qj | ≥ (2(j − i)− 1)ξ, and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, there exists less than N particle
pairs with j − i = k. Hence, the potential energy is bounded by
∑
i<j
Gm2
|qi − qj | ≤ N
N−1∑
k=1
Gm2
(2k − 1)ξ ≤ 2N log(N)
Gm2
ξ
< U (24)
by (21), where we used
N−1∑
k=1
1
(2k − 1) ≤ 1 +
N−1∑
k=2
1
k
≤ 1 +
N∫
1
1
x
dx = 1 + log(N) ≤ 2 log(N), for N ≥ 4.
32
In particular, we know that for q ∈ B and e.g. q1 = 0 we have |V (q)| < U , while
limq1→q2 |V (q)| = +∞. Hence, by the mean value theorem, there exists for any (q2, . . . ,qN ) ∈
B2 × . . .×BN a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that −V (λq2,q2, . . . ,qN ) = U . Moreover, we have
∇q1V (q1,q2, . . . ,qN ) = Gm2
N∑
i=2
q1 − qi
|q1 − qi|3 ,
and thus |∇q1V | ≤ |V |
2
Gm2 . Hence, if q1 is inside a ball of radius r =
Gm2
2U around λq2,
we certainly have |∇q1V | < (1 + )2U2 < 2U2 and |V − U | ≤ U . Moreover, m
∑N
i=1 q2i
increases by less than m(3ξ)2 < I, and thus remains within the interval [I ± I]. We
denote this ball by Kr(q). Its volume is 4pi3
(
Gm2
2U
)3
. The volume of a set Bj is
|Bj | = 4pi3
[
(2j − 1)3 − (2j − 2)3
]
ξ3 = 4pi3 [j(12j − 18) + 7] ≥
16pi
3 j
2 .
Hence:
|B2 × . . .×BN | =
N∏
j=2
|Bj | =
(16pi
3
)N−1
ξ3(N−1)
N∏
j=2
j2 =
(16pi
3
)N−1
ξ3(N−1)(N !)2 .
Now, we have on the one hand ξ3(N−1) ≥
(
3
4
) 3(N−1)
2
(
I
m
) 3(N−1)
2
N−
9(N−1)
2 . On the other
hand, comparing with the area of the unit sphere, Ω3N−1 = 2pi3N/2Γ( 3N2 )
, one checks that(
16pi
3
)N−1(3
4
) 3(N−1)
2
> Ω3N−1Γ
(
3N
2
)
eN2 . Thus:
(20) ≥ (2m)
3N−2
2
2N !h3N Ω
3N−1
∫
Kr(q)×B2×...×BN
d3Nq
(
E +
∑
i<j
Gm2
|qi − qj |
) 3N−2
2
1
{
. . .
}
1
{
. . .
}
≥C eN2 N− 9(N−1)2 (N !)2 Γ
(3N
2
)(Gm2
2U
)3
(E + (1− )U) 3N−22
( I
m
) 3N−3
2
.
Summing over all possible permutations of the particles over the rings in the definition
of B, we get an additional factor of N !. With the Sterling approximation Γ(n + 1) =
n! >
√
2pin
(
n
e
)n
, we finally obtain a lower bound of the form
(20) ≥ C N2e− 72N
(Gm2
U
)3
(E + (1− )U) 3N−22
( I
m
) 3N−3
2
.
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